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Abstract
In this paper we explore the relationship between international trade openness
and two major political distortions, political polarization and political instability.
We consider the extensive and intensive margins of trade as measured by the number
of trade partners and trade volume, respectively. As political distortions and trade
characteristics of the country are endogenously related, we instrument political in-
stability by the age difference between the youngest and the oldest effective political
leaders of a country and the average neighbors’ neighbors political instability. We
find that political instability reduces trade openness at the extensive and intensive
margin while political polarization negatively affects the extensive margin of trade.
We propose a simple model that provides intuition on our findings.
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1 Introduction
Recent advances in technologies and international cooperation have made the world econ-
omy more globalized, resulting in larger trade flows across countries. According to most of
the international trade theories, this should have contributed to improved efficiency and
higher living standards across the globe through better use of country-specific comparative
advantage in production or factor endowments (Ricardo, 1817; Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin,
1933; Balassa, 1963; Davis, 1997), through a rise in consumers utility from larger variety
of goods available (Armington, 1969; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1980) and, po-
tentially, through positive spillovers to economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Frankel
and Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Noguer and Siscart, 2005). Nevertheless, there
remains significant heterogeneity in the degree of countries openness to international trade
and country-specific international trade policies. The literature on politics of international
trade emphasizes the presence of interest groups as a determinant of cross-industry and
within-industry trade protection heterogeneity.1 The overall political climate of a country,
reflecting the dispersion and strength of such interest groups, can potentially influence
the cross-country openness heterogeneity.
In this paper we explore the relationship between international trade openness and
overall political climate of a country as measured by two major political distortions, po-
litical polarization and political instability. We consider both the extensive and intensive
margins of trade as measured by the number of trade partners and trade volume, respec-
tively, as well as the volatility of these variables.
First, we show that higher political polarization combined with political uncertainty
results in lower and more volatile trade openness in a simple political economy model of
international trade. That occurs because the parties representing groups with different
interests regarding the international trade choose different policies (more or less trade-
oriented), the formation of international trade links is costly, and the party in power can
be replaced by the opposition in the subsequent period. The resulting policy functions
are concave in political polarization, leading to the expected openness being decreasing in
1See Baldwin (1989) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) for review or early work in this area; Mitra
(1999), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Magee (2002), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) for recent the-
ories of lobbyist-driven protectionist policies; Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), Bombardini (2008), and Kim (2017) for examples of empirical analysis.
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polarization and political uncertainty. More polarized parties and, subsequently, policies,
and higher probability of policy changes lead to higher volatility of trade openness. These
results hold for two measures of trade openness: the traditional measure of expenditures on
foreign trade as a share to GDP (intensive margin) and the total fraction of international
trade links established through the government policy (extensive margin).
Second, we investigate the relationship between political distortions and trade open-
ness in a large cross section of countries. We proxy trade openness using two empirical
counterparts to the measures of trade openness applied in the model: the ratio of the sum
of exports and imports to the GDP (intensive margin) and the country’s degree centrality
in the international trade network reflecting the normalized number of country’s trading
partners (extensive margin). We find that political instability reduces trade openness
both at the extensive and intensive margin. For the intensive/extensive trade margin, the
effect is more/less profound for developing economies compared to the full sample. Politi-
cal polarization negatively affects the extensive margin of trade, but less so for developing
countries. We also find some evidence that political distortions lead to higher volatility
of trade openness.
The evaluation of the causal effect of political distortions on international trade open-
ness is complicated by the fact that both variables can be influenced by the third factor
such as the level of economic development or the same fundamental factors. Indeed, Dollar
and Kraay (2003) in their analysis of impact of international trade and institutional qual-
ity on economic growth found strong correlation between the exogenously instrumented
components of trade intensity and institutional quality. We address these issues by using
an instrumental variable approach to explain exogenous variation in political distortions.
In particular, we use the age difference between the youngest and oldest political leaders
in the country and the average political instability of the neighbors’ neighbors of a country
to instrument for political instability. We employ the World Bank political stability index
and the probability of political turnover constructed using Archidos dataset (Goemans
et. al, 2009) as two proxies of political instability. The traditional proxies for political
polarization include the ethnolinguistic polarization and income inequality (Esteban and
Ray, 2011). We use the former measure due to its exogeneity with respect to trade.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a two-period model
that provides the intuition behind the relationship between political distortions and trade
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openness. Section 3 describes empirical analysis: the data, the methodology, and the
estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The aim of the model is to provide intuition on the channels through which political
frictions can affect a country’s openness to international trade. We propose a simple
two-period model combining a version of Armigton “love for variety” international trade
model with political frictions in the form of political polarization and political uncertainty.
Consider an open economy inhabited by two types of households, type i and type
j, each type having measure 1/2, where the type determines the household preferences
over domestic versus foreign goods. The households live for two periods, in each of which
they decide how to allocate their endowment net of taxes between domestic and foreign
consumption. The household of type h ∈ {i, j} utility is given by:
u(h) = log
(
X1−µh0 X
µh
)
, (1)
where X0 denotes domestic consumption, X denotes aggregate consumption of foreign
goods, and µh is the weight on foreign goods consumption. The household budget con-
straint reads as follows:
X0 + PX = y(1− τ), (2)
where P is the foreign price index, y is the period endowment, and τ is the tax chosen by
the government. The foreign consumption aggregator X is defined as follows:
X =
(∫
n
xρi di
) 1
ρ
, ρ ∈ (0; 1), n ∈ [0, 1], (3)∫
n
pixidi = PX, (4)
where n denotes a fraction of the countries with which the trading links have been es-
tablished out of the total number of countries in the international trade network, xi is
consumption of goods from country i, ρ denotes substitutability between different foreign
goods, and pi is the price of xi.
The household problem can be solved in two stages: in the first stage, the household
decides how to allocate the disposable income between domestic and aggregate foreign
consumption to maximize its utility (1) subject to budget constraint (2), and in the second
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stage the household decides on the quantities of foreign goods xi given their prices pi, that
is, it maximizes (3) subject to (4).
We abstract from the determinants of foreign prices and assume for simplicity that pi =
p. The solution to the household problem is given by the following optimal allocations:
X0(h, τ) = (1− µh)y(1− τ), (5)
xi(h, τ) = x(h, τ) =
PX(h, τ)
np
, (6)
X(h, τ) =
µhy(1− τ)
P
= n
1
ρ
−1µhy(1− τ)
p
. (7)
The household indirect utility results:
u(h, τ, n) = log
(
(1− µh)1−µhµµhh p−µy
)
+ log (1− τ) + µhσ log n, σ = 1− ρ
ρ
. (8)
In this economy with endowment, y, and foreign prices, p, exogenously given, the
first term in (8) does not depend on the household choices or government policy. The
household welfare is a function of the household’s type, h, and it depends negatively on
the tax rate, τ , and positively on the number of links with foreign trade partners, n.
Next, we consider the problem of the government where the trade-off between τ and n is
introduced.
The government problem
There are two political parties competing for the place in government. Each party
represents one of the households types, i or j, that is, each party has its own prefer-
ences about international trade reflected in the party-specific weight on foreign goods
consumption µh, h ∈ {i, j}. In particular, we assume that
µi = µ+ ∆, µj = µ−∆, (9)
that is, party j and households of type j put larger weight on home consumption and
therefore are less interested in developing international trade relations as compared to
party and households of type i. The difference between µi and µj captured by ∆ represent
a measure of political polarization in the society. The party which wins the election
chooses the government policy to maximize the utility of its electorate. The government
policy consists of setting an income tax τ the revenues from which are used to finance
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establishment of new trade links with foreign economies.2 The process of link formation is
costly because it involves negotiations with perspective international partners, installing
the transport routes, and adjusting border control and legislation. We assume that the
fraction of trading partners and the tax revenues are related as follows:
nt = yτt + nt−1, (10)
with n0 = 0, so that the economy starts with zero trading partners. The sequence of
events in each of the two periods of economy life is as follows: First, the elections take
place. The party that wins the elections chooses the optimal tax or, equivalently, the
number of trading partners, to maximize the expected utility of its electorate. The new
trading links are established. The households consume their optimal allocations, given
the income net of taxes and given the available variety of foreign goods, n.
In the first period, each party has the same chances of being elected and the party in
power takes into account the expectations about the political election result in the next
period. In the second period, the incumbent is re-elected with probability P > 0.5, that is,
it enjoys “incumbency advantage” documented in empirical studies (see Azzimonti, 2015
for references and applications). In this setup, P is exogenous (see Azzimonti, 2011 for a
microfounded model of P ) and measures political stability in the economy with greater
P corresponding to less political uncertainty. Correspondingly, 1 − P reflect country’s
political instability. For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that the
inter-temporal discount factor is one.
The problem of the government at the beginning of the economy life can be formulated
as follows:3
max
τ1,τ2
log(1− τ1) + µhσ log n1 + P (log(1− τ2) + µhσ log n2) + (11)
(1− P )(log(1− τ¯2) + µhσ log n¯2),
s.t. : n1 = yτ1, n2 = y(τ1 + τ2), n¯2 = y(τ1 + τ¯2), (12)
τ¯2 = arg max{log(1− τ¯2) + µh¯σ log n¯2, s.t. : n¯2 = y(τ1 + τ¯2)}, (13)
2The government policy includes decision making over a broad set of variables: government spending,
public debt, international relations. Given that the focus of this study is on international trade, we
abstract from the remaining fiscal tools and decisions.
3The first term in the household indirect utility (8) does not depend on the government choice variables
and therefore is omitted in the government problem.
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where h ∈ i, j, h¯ = ¬h, and τ¯2 and n¯2 represent the policy chosen by the opposition party
if it is elected in the second period. The problem of the party in power can be solved
backwards. The optimal policies are as follows:
τ1(h1) =
µh1σ +
√
µh1σ(8 + 9µh1σ)
4 + 4µh1σ
, (14)
τ2(h2, h1) =
µh2σ − τ1(h1)
1 + µh2σ
, (15)
n1(h1) = τ1(h1)y, (16)
n2(h2, h1) =
µh2σ(1 + τ1(h1))
1 + µh2σ
y, (17)
where h1 and h2 are the types of the party in power in the first and second period,
respectively.
Given the government policy, we can compute the measures of trade openness in this
economy, as follows. The expected connectedness of the country, En, is given by the
expected number of trading partners over the economy lifetime:
En = 0.5(n1(i) + n1(j) + P (n2(i, i) + n2(j, j)) + (1− P )(n2(i, j) + n2(j, i))). (18)
This measure reflects the country’s extensive trade margin.
The expenditures on trade in a given period t, tet, given that the party in power is h, is
the fraction of spending on foreign goods by type i and type j households, plus spending
on investment in new trade links:
tet(h) = 1− 1/2X0(µi, τt(h))
y
− 1/2X0(µj, τt(h))
y
= (19)
1− 0.5(2− µi − µj)(1− τ(h)).
The expected trade expenditures, Ete, is given by the expected fraction of spending on
international trade over the economy lifetime which summing up over all possible tet(h)
and simplifying, results in the following expression:
Ete = 0.5(2− 0.5(2− µi − µj)(2− τ1(i)− τ1(j))) + (20)
P
2
(2− 0.5(2− µi − µj)(2− τ2(i, i)− τ2(j, j))) +
1− P
2
(2− 0.5(2− µi − µj)(2− τ2(i, j)− τ2(j, i))).
This measure reflects the country’s intensive trade margin.
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The impact of political frictions
We can now characterize the impact of political frictions in the form of political polar-
ization, ∆, and political instability, 1 − P , on the levels and volatility of trade openness
as measured by (18) and (20). The proofs of Lemma and Propositions in this section are
relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1. The first period tax rate and the number of trade partners are increasing and
concave in the government’s weight on foreign consumption: dτ1(h)
dµh
= dn1(h)
dµh
> 0; d
2τ1(h)
dµ2h
=
d2n1(h)
dµ2h
< 0; the second period tax rate is increasing in the second period government’s
weight on foreign consumption and decreasing in the first period government’s weight on
foreign consumption: dτ2(h2,h1)
dµh2
> 0, dτ2(h2,h1)
dµh1
< 0; the second period number of trade
partners is increasing in both the first and the second period governments’ weight on
foreign consumption: dn2(h2,h1)
dµh1
> 0, dn2(h2,h1)
dµh2
> 0.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward: investment in trade links is increas-
ing in the party’s in power preferences for foreign consumption. Given that the economy
starts with zero trading links, it is optimal to invest heavily in n in the first period and to
impose a low tax in the second period, thus achieving certain “consumption smoothing,”
usually discussed in the literature on fiscal policy.
The next proposition establishes that political frictions in the form of political polar-
ization and political uncertainty lead to lower international trade openness as measured
by the expected trade connectedness and expected expenditures on international trade.
Proposition 1. The expected fraction of established international trade links is de-
creasing in political polarization and political instability. The expected expenditures on
international trade are decreasing in political polarization and political uncertainty.
These results are the consequence of the taxes being concave in polarization. Keeping
constant the average weight on foreign consumption, more polarized preferences of the
competing parties, reflected in larger deviations of their weights on foreign consumption
compared to the average, results in lower average expected tax rate, and thus, lower
degree of international trade integration. The logarithmic preferences result in the optimal
government policies being independent of the political stability, P . The expected trade
links and expenditures, however, decrease in the political instability because of the same
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concavity argument: lower P leads to lower expected trade integration because of the
larger differences between the policies preferred by the competing parties.
We can also characterize the expected volatility of trade openness in the model econ-
omy. Given that there are only two periods, the volatility can be measured as the variance
of the growth rate of trade openness, measured either by the total expenditures on trade
or by the number of trading partners, with the growth rate defined as follows:
gop(h2, h1) =
op2(h2, h1)− op1(h1)
op1(h1)
, (21)
where opt is trade openness in period t = 1, 2 and opt = nt or opt = tet, in the case of
trade connectedness and trade expenditures measures of trade openness, respectively.
There are two potential sources of exogenous fluctuations in the trade openness in a
given country, keeping constant the international conditions such as foreign prices. The
sources of fluctuations are output volatility, captured by changes in endowment y and
volatility due to political frictions, captured by changes in the type of the party in power,
h. Given exogenous endowment, the output volatility is independent of political frictions
and does not affect the dependence of trade openness volatility on political distortions.
Therefore, we assume that y is constant. The volatility of trade openness can be defined
as follows:
V gop = 1/2(P (gop(i, i)− Egop)2 + (1− P )(gop(j, i)− Egop)2 + (22)
P (gop(j, j)− Egop)2 + (1− P )(gop(i, j)− Egop)2),
where Egop denotes the expected growth rate of trade openness defined as follows:
Egop =
1
2
[Pgop(i, i) + Pgop(j, j) + (1− P )gop(j, i) + (1− P )gop(i, j))] . (23)
We can characterize the relationship between political instability and the volatility of
trade openness as follows.
Proposition 2. The volatility of the trade openness measured as a fraction of established
international trade links or as total expenditures on international trade is decreasing in
political stability.
That is, trade openness is more volatile when political instability is higher. Intuitively,
we would also expect the volatility of trade openness to depend positively on political
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polarization. Although we cannot prove this statement formally due to the volatility of
trade openness being highly nonlinear in political polarization, our numerical simulations
suggest that there is positive relationship between these two variables for a broad set of
parameter values.
In the next section, we analyze the relationship between international trade openness
and political distortions empirically, and show that a fraction of established international
trade partners and trade volume are decreasing in political stability and political polar-
ization, in accordance with the model presented here.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Political Distortions and Levels of Trade Openness
Our aim is to investigate whether the level and volatility of trade openness depend on
political distortions using the data from a cross section of countries. We start with the
level of trade openness and estimate the following equation:
OPENi = β0 + β1PISi + β2POLARIZi + γX+ i, (24)
where i denotes country, OPEN is the measure of trade openness, PIS is the measure
of political instability, and POLARIZ is the measure of political polarization. Each
observation is the average value of the corresponding time-series variable over the period
1996–2014. X is a set of control variables consisting of the fundamental factors which
determine trade openness according to the literature: logarithm of population, logarithm
of total area in km, latitude, and longitude.
We use two measures of trade openness that characterize the intensive and extensive
trade margins and reflect the definitions of trade openness used in the model from the
previous section. First, we use the traditional measure of trade openness computed as the
ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the GDP; we denote this variable TradeVolume.
Second, we proxy trade openness by the country’s degree centrality in the international
trade network, that is, the number of countries which are the country’s trading partners
normalized by the total number of countries constituting international trade network. We
denote this variable TradeLinks. These two measures reflect different aspects of interna-
tional trade, the intensive and extensive margins, respectively, and are uncorrelated in
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the data.
Political instability is a broad concept that can refer to the likelihood of riots, rev-
olutions and other forms of violence as well as to the probability of major changes in
the government such as those caused by re-elections. We use two measures of political
instability to capture the former and the latter definitions. First, we use the inverse of the
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism index by the World Bank (World
Bank Governance Indicators) which measures perceptions of the likelihood of political
instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.
Second, we use Archidos dataset (Goemans et. al, 2009) which contains the informa-
tion on effective political leaders4 for a broad set of countries and a long time span to
construct a political instability measure which reflects the political turnover, or probabil-
ity of major changes in the government. For each country, we compute political turnover
as the ratio of the number of regular changes of effective political leader to the total
number of changes of effective political leader using the data on political leaders entry
and exit during 1970-2014, or shorter period when the earliest available date is after 1970.
The total number of changes of effective leader consists of regular and irregular changes.
A loss of office is considered irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of
explicit rules and established conventions (Goemans et. al, 2009). We define the regular
changes of effective political leader as those done according to the prevailing rules, pro-
visions, conventions and norms of the country or because of natural death or retirement
due to poor health.
We denote the political instability measure from the World Bank as PIS 1 and the
political turnover measure based on Archidos data as PIS 2. The correlation between
these two political instability measures is 0.46.
The traditional proxies for political polarization include the ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization and income inequality (Woo, 2009; Esteban and Ray, 2011). The problem with
using income inequality as an explanatory variable for international trade openness is its
strict endogeneity. In particular, Spilimbergo, et. al (1999) show that income distribution
4According to Goemans et. al, (2009), effective leader means the person that de facto exercised
power in a country. In parliamentary regimes, the Prime Minister is coded as the leader, in presidential
systems, the President. In regimes that combine elements of both parliamentary and presidential systems
the president is coded as the leader since in these regimes presidents typically control foreign policy. In
communist states the Chairman of the Party is generally coded as the effective ruler.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Full Sample Developing Countries
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max
AGE DIF 134 23.71 10.46 0 55 107 24.50 10.77 0 55
TradeVolume 134 79.06 33.06 7.199 184.3 107 79.20 33.18 7.199 184.3
TradeLinks 134 0.663 0.216 0.195 0.999 107 0.605 0.192 0.195 0.973
STD TradeVolume 134 0.123 0.198 0.0417 1.964 107 0.138 0.219 0.0423 1.964
STD TradeLinks 134 0.0484 0.0270 0.00286 0.128 107 0.0546 0.0247 0.00843 0.128
LAREA 134 11.34 1.446 6.087 13.79 107 11.33 1.496 6.087 13.79
LPOP 134 16.09 1.648 12.52 20.98 107 16.09 1.640 12.52 20.98
POLARIZ 134 0.446 0.260 0 0.930 107 0.494 0.245 0 0.930
PIS 1 134 2.122 0.888 0.467 4.362 107 2.375 0.769 0.835 4.362
PIS 2 134 0.153 0.216 0 0.727 107 0.177 0.222 0 0.727
LATITUDE 134 0.187 0.252 -0.370 0.640 107 0.136 0.229 -0.370 0.590
LONGITUDE 134 0.171 0.624 -1.180 1.780 107 0.172 0.627 -0.970 1.780
inc developing 134 0.799 0.403 0 1 107 1 0 1 1
AVG NN PIS 1 117 1.613 0.605 0 2.652 96 1.758 0.511 0 2.652
AVG NN PIS 2 117 0.117 0.102 0 0.419 96 0.132 0.0974 0 0.419
Note: The first five columns report summary statistics for the full sample; the last five columns report
summary statistics for developing countries. Data sources: all the data is from the World Bank, except
for PIS 2, AVG NN PIS 2 – calculated from the data by Goemans et. al, (2009); POLARIZ – from
Alesina et al., (2003); and TradeLinks – calculated from the data by Fouquin and Hugot (2016) .
is determined jointly by trade openness and factor endowments. Ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization is a fundamental factor that can potentially influence both trade openness and
political polarization. Given that ethnolinguistic polarization has been considered as the
main determinant of political polarization and, under our hypothesis, political polarization
is a determinant of international trade openness, we include ethnolinguistic polarization
directly as an explanatory variable in the trade openness equation.5 We have to keep in
mind that its coefficient can reflect the proximate impact of political polarization on trade
openness or the impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on trade openness. We discuss
both interpretations and their relative importance below when we present the results.
The final dataset obtained after removing three outliers for which the trade openness
is greater than 250 percent of GDP contains 134 countries, 27 developed and 107 devel-
oping.6 Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. All the data except for the political
instability measure PIS 2, leaders’ age difference AGE DIF, ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization, and trade network centrality is from the World Bank. We calculate the trade
network centrality using the bilateral trade data collected by Fouquin and Hugot (2016).
The ethnolinguistic fractionalization data is from Alesina et al., (2003). The variable
AGE DIF is calculated using the data from Goemans et. al, (2009) as discussed below.
5Thus, for political polarization, we consider a reduced form version of the equation determining trade
openness instead of the two-stage least squares because we have more information for ethnolinguistic
fractionalization than for political polarization.
6All the reported results are robust to inclusion of these outliers.
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We expect negative coefficients for political instability and political polarization mea-
sures, given our hypothesis that higher political distortions lead to lower levels of trade
openness.
Table 2 provides the results of OLS estimation of equation (24). Columns (1)–(5)
report the estimates for the full sample of countries and Columns (6)–(10) report the
estimates for the sample restricted to developing countries. Political instability has neg-
ative association with the measure of intensive margin of trade (trade volume) and this
association is more profound for developing economies. For the extensive margin of trade,
proxied by the trade network degree centrality, the coefficients of political instability are
also negative and significant, but are lower in absolute value for developing countries.
It is a stylized fact that political stability and trade openness increase with the level
of economic development. This could lead to more negative coefficients of the political
instability measures for developing countries in Table 2. However, in that case we would
also expect the coefficients to be more negative for both the intensive and extensive
margins of trade. Another possibility is that political instability matters more for trade
volume in developing economies compared with developed countries and it matters less
for trade links formation in developing economies compared with developed countries. To
test these hypotheses we attempt to identify the causal effect of political instability on
trade openness as discussed below.
Political polarization proxied by ethnolinguistic fractionalization is insignificant for the
trade volume measure of trade openness (intensive margin), and is negative and significant
for the network degree centrality measure of trade openness (extensive margin). Ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious
heterogeneity of population in a country. It is a proxy for political polarization, but it
may reflect other aspects of society. This complicates the interpretation due to potentially
opposite effects of this variable on trade openness. On the one hand, one may argue that
higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization should lead to higher number of trade partners
because each ethnic group would want to trade with the country of its ethnic origin to
consume its traditional goods. On the other hand, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization
as a cause/proxy of higher political polarization should reduce trade openness due to the
reasons outlined in the model from the previous section. The negative and significant
coefficient of this variable for the extensive margin of trade suggests that the effect due to
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Table 2: Political distortions and levels of trade openness, OLS estimates
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
TradeVolume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 -10.54*** -4.208 -16.18*** -8.611*
(2.999) (3.310) (3.667) (4.452)
PIS 2 -18.97 -21.72* -26.62* -26.70**
(13.22) (11.18) (14.52) (11.80)
POLARIZ -3.559 8.108 6.738 -9.336 -1.358 -5.858
(11.01) (10.49) (10.36) (12.66) (11.49) (11.14)
LAREA 2.130 2.360 3.742** 4.218**
(1.626) (1.555) (1.687) (1.654)
LPOP -10.44*** -11.43*** -10.10*** -12.04***
(1.726) (1.406) (2.032) (1.481)
LATITUDE 23.53** 23.12** 23.04** 18.74*
(9.446) (9.320) (9.940) (9.791)
LONGITUDE 7.262* 7.686* 9.565** 9.986**
(4.040) (4.027) (4.417) (4.555)
Constant 101.4*** 81.97*** 80.65*** 222.6*** 230.9*** 117.6*** 83.94*** 83.81*** 215.6*** 228.5***
(7.024) (3.472) (5.414) (24.43) (23.53) (9.047) (3.972) (6.550) (28.68) (27.38)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.080 0.016 0.001 0.318 0.328 0.141 0.032 0.005 0.361 0.363
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
TradeLinks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 -0.0855*** -0.126*** -0.0106 -0.0968***
(0.0197) (0.0168) (0.0258) (0.0213)
PIS 2 -0.392*** -0.275*** -0.254*** -0.230***
(0.0654) (0.0622) (0.0673) (0.0520)
POLARIZ -0.298*** -0.0838* -0.194*** -0.139* -0.0494 -0.107**
(0.0683) (0.0490) (0.0533) (0.0801) (0.0549) (0.0521)
LAREA -0.0108 -0.00279 -0.0126 -0.00769
(0.00901) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0104)
LPOP 0.0970*** 0.0695*** 0.0990*** 0.0774***
(0.00839) (0.00826) (0.00959) (0.00828)
LATITUDE 0.133*** 0.155** 0.111** 0.0685
(0.0479) (0.0631) (0.0500) (0.0598)
LONGITUDE -0.0349 -0.0362 -0.0541** -0.0514**
(0.0215) (0.0263) (0.0217) (0.0236)
Constant 0.844*** 0.723*** 0.796*** -0.490*** -0.318** 0.630*** 0.650*** 0.674*** -0.597*** -0.460***
(0.0463) (0.0225) (0.0376) (0.130) (0.141) (0.0646) (0.0238) (0.0466) (0.148) (0.152)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.124 0.156 0.128 0.655 0.534 0.002 0.088 0.032 0.560 0.520
Note: The first and the last five columns report OLS results for the full sample and for developing
countries, respectively. The dependent variable is trade openness measured as the ratio of the sum of
exports and imports to the GDP (TradeVolume) and international trade network degree centrality
(TradeLinks) in the top and bottom panel, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
political frictions dominates. Interestingly, the impact of polarization on intensive margin
of trade openness is twice smaller when the sample is restricted to developing countries.
A possible explanation of this result could be that the number of factors causing lower
trade openness is larger for developing economies, leading to smaller impact of political
polarization as compared to the full sample. For example, in developing economy in-
vestment climate and institutions are likely to influence international trade more than
in developed economies where the capital accumulation and the institutions quality are
relatively stable over time. We abstract from these other potential determinants of trade
openness in our model due to their endogeneity which could lead to inconsistent results
and obscure interpretation.
The coefficients for political instability measures reported in Table 2 may be inconsis-
tent due to potential mutual causality, the fact that political instability and trade open-
ness can be jointly determined by the third variable, and because the political instability
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Table 3: First stage regressions
Full Sample Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES PIS 1 PIS 1 PIS 2 PIS 2 PIS 1 PIS 1 PIS 2 PIS 2
AGE DIF 0.0167** 0.0150** 0.00412** 0.00420** 0.00940 0.00782 0.00462** 0.00492**
(0.00724) (0.00639) (0.00168) (0.00183) (0.00743) (0.00605) (0.00190) (0.00209)
AVG NN PIS 1 0.654*** 0.525*** 0.372** 0.325**
(0.129) (0.127) (0.161) (0.139)
POLARIZ 0.770*** -0.0783 0.791** -0.0963
(0.291) (0.0850) (0.302) (0.100)
LAREA -0.0655 -0.000770 -0.0619 0.00460
(0.0549) (0.0136) (0.0574) (0.0157)
LPOP 0.201*** -0.00657 0.217*** -0.00484
(0.0435) (0.0106) (0.0460) (0.0128)
LATITUDE -0.403 -0.0926 0.239 -0.104
(0.330) (0.0734) (0.344) (0.0900)
LONGITUDE 0.100 0.0116 -0.0243 0.0102
(0.132) (0.0348) (0.131) (0.0416)
AVG NN PIS 2 1.195*** 1.236*** 1.088*** 1.188***
(0.182) (0.189) (0.219) (0.208)
Constant 0.745*** -1.817** -0.0768** 0.0864 1.536*** -1.584 -0.0756 -0.00777
(0.276) (0.913) (0.0387) (0.262) (0.376) (0.960) (0.0511) (0.307)
Obs 117 117 117 117 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.256 0.429 0.330 0.342 0.075 0.297 0.245 0.261
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat. 19.608 28.451 13.434 22.429 3.761 15.329 3.339 15.000
Note: The first and the last four columns report the First Stage regression results for the full sample
and for developing countries, respectively. The dependent variable is political instability PIS 1 or PIS 2.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
measures are likely to suffer from measurement errors.
Thus, we need instruments for political instability. The search for valid instruments
is complicated by the fact that most of the fundamental factors that influence political
polarization also influence trade openness (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Therefore, standard
instruments used in the literature, such as legal origins, geography, settler mortality, or
distance from equator, may not capture the independent impact of political polarization
on trade openness. One way to proceed could be to use the time series component of the
variables of interest and explore the lagged variables as instruments. However, this panel
approach requires a number of assumptions on the relationship between the explanatory
variables and error terms which are difficult to test and the length of the data is not long
enough to ensure that sufficient number of instruments could be used. Moreover, the
main variables of interest are quite persistent over time, so exploring their time variation
might not be very informative. Therefore, we proceed with the cross section estimation
and attempt to employ the instruments that directly influence political instability and
are not straightforward determinants of trade openness.
We use the age difference between the youngest and oldest political leaders in a country
between 1970-2014 or shorter period, depending on data availability, and the average
political instability of the neighbors’ neighbors of a country to instrument for political
instability. We compute the age of political leader from Archidos dataset (Goemans et. al,
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2009) which reports the data on the year of birth and year on entry to and exit from the
office of each political leader. We suggest that higher variability of political leaders’ ages
observed in a given country can signal higher political instability. The political leader
should potentially have appropriate education and sufficient experience in the political
area to be able to win the office and to exercise power. High variation in age of the leader
implies that the education and/or experience criteria of the leader also vary over time
which can influence the political climate in a country.7 At the same time, the variation in
age should not directly influence country’s openness to trade assuming the distribution of
preferences over trade volume and the number of trading partners is not age-dependent.
We use the average political instability of the neighbors’ neighbors of a country as
another instrument for political instability. It has been recognized that geographical
neighbors play important role in a country’s economic development (see, for example,
Ades and Chua, 1997 and Bosker and Garretsen, 2009). In particular, policies conducted
in contiguous territories can influence political attitudes in a given country through social
links and cultural ties; political instability in the adjacent region may lead to higher gov-
ernment spending for protection of stability in domestic economy; it may also influence
the economic growth and international trade, and interfere a country’s development path.
We suggest that the neighbors’ neighbors political instability should not have significant
direct influence on a country’s economic indicators. For example, the absence of common
borders implies that there is no need to change domestic policy in response to escalation
in some of the neighbors’ neighbor countries. International relations, and trade in partic-
ular, with neighbors’ neighbors are more likely to be determined by a variety of factors
other than geographic closeness. At the same time, the neighbors’ neighbors political
instability can potentially influence a country’s political instability through its impact on
this country’s neighbors’ political climate.
Table 3 shows the first-stage regressions corresponding to the instrumental variable
(IV) regressions reported in Table 4. Both instruments of political instability have high
predictive power in the full sample with positive coefficients, as expected. When the sam-
ple is restricted to developing countries, the age difference of political leaders becomes
insignificant for political instability measure by the World Bank. Among the remain-
ing exogenous variables, logarithm of population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are
7There are different measures of variation; we use the age difference between the youngest and oldest
political leader because it appears to be the strongest instrument.
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Table 4: Political distortions and levels of trade openness, IV estimates
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
TradeVolume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PIS 1 -15.48** -23.70*** -35.83** -47.50**
(7.082) (8.628) (15.57) (20.54)
PIS 2 -44.70 -53.46** -57.20 -45.50
(27.27) (24.35) (36.15) (28.61)
POLARIZ 19.15 0.608 29.28 -9.916
(15.46) (11.11) (24.70) (11.56)
LAREA 0.738 2.381 1.434 4.384**
(2.132) (1.866) (2.969) (1.987)
LPOP -7.977*** -12.79*** -2.419 -12.51***
(2.602) (1.487) (5.606) (1.657)
LATITUDE 2.400 13.29 31.92 17.32
(13.72) (11.47) (20.13) (12.05)
LONGITUDE 15.55** 12.30** 11.05 10.83*
(6.130) (5.407) (6.986) (5.768)
Constant 112.7*** 85.85*** 240.7*** 263.4*** 164.9*** 88.57*** 194.8*** 240.0***
(16.23) (5.457) (36.05) (34.76) (37.59) (7.389) (61.61) (39.07)
Observations 117 117 117 117 96 96 96 96
Hansen p-value 0.7215 0.4378 0.1440 0.7349 0.8072 0.9449 0.2492 0.5232
Endogeneity p-value 0.5827 0.2863 0.0283 0.1154 0.1315 0.2819 0.0195 0.3045
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
TradeLinks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PIS 1 -0.232*** -0.166*** -0.184 -0.175*
(0.0558) (0.0429) (0.144) (0.0934)
PIS 2 -0.734*** -0.452*** -0.371** -0.356***
(0.166) (0.136) (0.174) (0.135)
POLARIZ -0.0126 -0.130** 0.0213 -0.104*
(0.0690) (0.0579) (0.108) (0.0592)
LAREA -0.00877 0.00206 -0.00756 0.00394
(0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0115)
LPOP 0.108*** 0.0733*** 0.117*** 0.0807***
(0.0139) (0.00945) (0.0254) (0.00949)
LATITUDE 0.169*** 0.235*** 0.173*** 0.114*
(0.0650) (0.0622) (0.0545) (0.0660)
LONGITUDE -0.0516* -0.0706** -0.0690** -0.0683**
(0.0285) (0.0300) (0.0297) (0.0299)
Constant 1.171*** 0.779*** -0.646*** -0.461** 1.052*** 0.673*** -0.814*** -0.639***
(0.118) (0.0306) (0.197) (0.199) (0.346) (0.0362) (0.266) (0.191)
Obs 117 117 117 117 96 96 96 96
Hansen p-value 0.1035 0.5096 0.3947 0.7889 0.2243 0.2074 0.6053 0.555
Endogeneity p-value 0.0025 0.0011 0.1548 0.0230 0.1074 0.1472 0.3423 0.1585
Note: The first and the last four columns report IV results for the full sample and for developing
countries, respectively. The dependent variable is trade openness measured as the ratio of the sum of
exports and imports to the GDP (TradeVolume) and international trade network degree centrality
(TradeLinks) in the top and bottom panel, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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significant determinants of political instability measure by the World Bank (Columns
(2)–(3), (8)–(9)), but insignificant for the political turnover measure (Columns (5)–(6),
(11)–(12)). The Cragg-Donald Wald test results, reported in Table 3, suggest rejection
of the weak instrument hypothesis for the full sample. For the sample of countries re-
stricted to developing economies, the test suggests that there is some evidence that the
instruments are weak. Nevetheless, we report the IV results both for the full and for the
restricted sample, for completeness.
The 2SLS IV estimates reported in Table 4 yield negative and significant coefficients
for both political instability variables.8 The results of the Hansen test suggest that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The coefficients are larger in
absolute value than their OLS counterparts. One possible reason for this discrepancy is the
measurement errors in the political instability variables which result in the OLS estimates
biased towards zero. We apply the endogeneity test to gain some insight into consistency
of the OLS estimates. The results are mixed: For the TradeV olume measure of trade
openness, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the political instability measures are
exogenous, which implies that the corresponding OLS estimates are more efficient. For the
TradeLinks measure of trade openness, the political instability measures are endogenous
in the full sample, suggesting that the OLS estimates are inconsistent.
In qualitative terms, the pattern of the IV and OLS estimates is the same: The impact
of political instability on the intensive/extensive trade margin is more/less profound in
developing countries as compared to the full sample. We can conjecture that political
instability matters more for trade openness in developing countries, although the weakness
of the instruments for developing economies casts doubts on the validity of this conjecture.
Overall, the estimation results suggest that higher political distortions lead to lower
levels of trade openness. Political instability has negative impact on both the exten-
sive and intensive trade margins. Higher political polarization negatively influences the
extensive trade margin.
Next, we analyze the relationship between the political distortions and the volatility
of trade openness.
8We apply the 2SLS estimator because of the relatively small sample size. The GMM estimation yields
very similar results.
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Table 5: Political distortions and volatility of trade openness, OLS estimates
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
STD TradeVolume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 0.0728** 0.0813* 0.0882* 0.0989
(0.0361) (0.0470) (0.0519) (0.0626)
PIS 2 0.0871*** 0.0678** 0.0669** 0.0586*
(0.0301) (0.0296) (0.0322) (0.0309)
POLARIZ 0.0710*** -0.0229 0.0684*** 0.0395 -0.0328 0.0428
(0.0270) (0.0655) (0.0243) (0.0444) (0.0782) (0.0366)
LAREA 0.00916 0.00370 0.00916 0.00506
(0.00842) (0.00913) (0.00987) (0.00986)
LPOP -0.00912* 0.00802 -0.0137 0.00821
(0.00540) (0.00769) (0.00855) (0.00914)
LATITUDE 0.0387 0.0149 0.0238 0.0545
(0.0488) (0.0347) (0.0460) (0.0595)
LONGITUDE 0.0215 0.0263 0.0241 0.0263
(0.0165) (0.0185) (0.0199) (0.0201)
Constant -0.0314 0.110*** 0.0915*** -0.00706 -0.0960 -0.0710 0.127*** 0.119*** 0.0283 -0.0945
(0.0618) (0.0163) (0.0231) (0.111) (0.126) (0.105) (0.0219) (0.0383) (0.134) (0.147)
Observations 134 134 134 134 134 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.120 0.030 0.096 0.005 0.002 0.110 0.026
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
STD TradeLinks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 0.00338 0.00566** -0.00705** -0.00409
(0.00246) (0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00347)
PIS 2 0.0198** 0.0140 0.00243 0.00381
(0.00985) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0110)
POLARIZ 0.0113 -0.00432 0.000322 -0.00923 -0.00811 -0.0118
(0.00805) (0.00847) (0.00827) (0.00847) (0.00903) (0.00878)
LAREA -0.000474 -0.000828 -0.000601 -0.000466
(0.00163) (0.00156) (0.00172) (0.00173)
LPOP -0.00484*** -0.00360** -0.00182 -0.00271
(0.00176) (0.00151) (0.00216) (0.00181)
LATITUDE -0.0240** -0.0248** -0.0118 -0.0126
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0120)
LONGITUDE -0.00242 -0.00242 -0.00256 -0.00283
(0.00382) (0.00388) (0.00403) (0.00402)
Constant 0.0412*** 0.0453*** 0.0433*** 0.127*** 0.118*** 0.0713*** 0.0542*** 0.0592*** 0.106*** 0.111***
(0.00637) (0.00310) (0.00468) (0.0263) (0.0261) (0.00764) (0.00333) (0.00508) (0.0291) (0.0299)
Obs 134 134 134 134 134 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.012 0.026 0.012 0.161 0.148 0.048 0.000 0.008 0.086 0.075
Note: The first and the last five columns report OLS results for the full sample and for developing
countries, respectively. The dependent variable is the volatility of trade openness measured as the
standard deviation of the growth of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the GDP
(STD TradeVolume) and as the standard deviation of the growth of international trade network degree
centrality (STD TradeLinks) in the top and bottom panel, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.2 Political Distortions and Volatility of Trade Openness
For the volatility of trade openness, we estimate the following equation:
SDOPENi = β0 + β1PISi + β2POLARIZi + γX+ i, (25)
where the dependent variable, SDOPEN is the standard deviation of the growth rate of
the trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports over GDP or the trade
network degree centrality, and calculated over the period 1996–2014. The explanatory
variables are the same as in (24). We expect positive coefficients for political instability
and political polarization measures, given our hypothesis that higher political distortions
lead to higher volatility of trade openness.
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of equation (25) and Table 6 reports the corre-
sponding IV estimates. The OLS results feature positive and significant coefficients for
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Table 6: Political distortions and volatility of trade openness, IV estimates
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
STD TradeVolume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PIS 1 0.0530*** 0.0435 0.0465 0.0297
(0.0205) (0.0361) (0.0496) (0.0679)
PIS 2 0.176** 0.119 0.107 0.0620
(0.0830) (0.109) (0.111) (0.121)
POLARIZ 0.0168 0.0476 0.0176 0.0387
(0.0577) (0.0403) (0.0824) (0.0475)
LAREA 0.00742 0.00458 0.00743 0.00547
(0.00968) (0.0115) (0.0104) (0.0137)
LPOP -0.000571 0.00842 0.00234 0.00856
(0.00752) (0.00823) (0.0159) (0.00917)
LATITUDE 0.0130 -0.00449 0.0373 0.0473
(0.0507) (0.0398) (0.0518) (0.0589)
LONGITUDE 0.0360 0.0410 0.0349 0.0348
(0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0248) (0.0250)
Constant 0.0120 0.100*** -0.0579 -0.106 0.0304 0.124*** -0.0716 -0.102
(0.0369) (0.0186) (0.171) (0.161) (0.119) (0.0310) (0.233) (0.195)
Obs 117 117 117 117 96 96 96 96
Hansen p-value 0.1678 0.2409 0.1874 0.2830 0.1859 0.1734 0.2100 0.1952
Endogeneity p-value 0.9187 0.0763 0.8067 0.3915 0.7038 0.1290 0.9304 0.5059
Dependent: Full Sample Developing Countries
STD TradeLinks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PIS 1 0.0134** 0.0105 -0.0125 -0.00993
(0.00675) (0.00707) (0.0137) (0.0162)
PIS 2 0.0363** 0.0296* -0.0176 -0.00364
(0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0209) (0.0196)
POLARIZ -0.0157 -0.00834 -0.00463 -0.0134
(0.0121) (0.00960) (0.0173) (0.00964)
LAREA 0.000104 -0.000576 -0.000239 0.000358
(0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00183) (0.00165)
LPOP -0.00605*** -0.00387** -0.000672 -0.00280
(0.00210) (0.00167) (0.00394) (0.00196)
LATITUDE -0.0293** -0.0334*** -0.00653 -0.00942
(0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0123)
LONGITUDE 7.50e-05 0.00124 -0.00346 -0.00355
(0.00463) (0.00457) (0.00505) (0.00502)
Constant 0.0185 0.0422*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.0842** 0.0571*** 0.0954** 0.105***
(0.0151) (0.00416) (0.0341) (0.0360) (0.0340) (0.00498) (0.0376) (0.0354)
Obs 117 117 117 117 96 96 96 96
Hansen p-value 0.4940 0.8610 0.6110 0.8827 0.8440 0.7209 0.5910 0.3873
Endogeneity p-value 0.1267 0.2939 0.4677 0.3079 0.5567 0.2503 0.5465 0.6080
Note: The first and the last four columns report IV results for the full sample and for developing
countries, respectively. The dependent variable is the volatility of trade openness measured as the
standard deviation of the growth of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the GDP
(STD TradeVolume) and as the standard deviation of the growth of international trade network degree
centrality (STD TradeLinks) in the top and bottom panel, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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political instability in the full sample. Political polarization positively and significantly
influences the volatility of trade volume but is insignificant for the volatility of trade
network degree centrality. In the IV estimates, the measure of political turnover is still
significant for the extensive trade margin but the other coefficients of political distortions
become insignificant once the fundamental factors such as logarithm of population or
geographical position captured by latitude are added to the equation. However, the en-
dogeneity test suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that political instability
is exogenous, for all variants of the model estimated. Therefore, the OLS estimates are
more efficient. For the sample restricted to developing countries, the political distortions
have insignificant coefficients. Thus, our results suggest that political frictions do not
have a primary importance for fluctuations of trade openness in developing countries but
in general higher political instability increases the volatility of trade openness.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between trade openness and political distortions
in the form of political instability and political polarization. We aimed to explore the
exogenous variation in the political frictions to evaluate their causal effect on trade open-
ness. In doing so, we found that political distortions lead to lower trade openness, both at
the extensive and intensive trade margin. Moreover, we found some evidence that higher
political distortions lead to higher volatility of trade openness. We provided a theoreti-
cal foundations on the negative impact of political distortions on trade using a standard
model of international trade combined with political frictions. Our findings suggest that
policies aimed at improving the political climate of a country can be beneficial for inter-
national trade, both in terms of trade volume and in terms of the number of country’s
trading partners.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The results obtain by taking the derivatives of (14)-(17) with
respect to µh1 and µh2 and simplifying:
dτ1(h1)
dµh1
=
dn1(h1)
dµh1
=
σ
(
5µh1σ +
√
µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8) + 4
)
4(µh1σ + 1)
2
√
µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8)
> 0. (26)
d2τ1(h1)
dµ2h1
=
d2n1(h1)
dµ2h1
= −σ
2(µh1σ(8(
√
µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8) + 6)+
2(µh1σ + 1)
3(µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8))
3/2
(27)
3µh1σ(15µh1σ + 3
√
µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8) + 28)) + 8)
2(µh1σ + 1)
3(µh1σ(9µh1σ + 8))
3/2
< 0.
dτ2(h2, h1)
dµh2
=
σ + τ1(h1)
(1 + µh2σ)
2
> 0,
dτ2(h2, h1)
dµh1
= − 1
1 + µh2σ
< 0. (28)
dn2(h2, h1)
dµh2
=
σ(1 + τ1(h1))
(1 + µh2σ)
2
> 0,
dn2(h2, h1)
dµh1
=
µh2
1 + µh2σ
> 0. (29)
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we show that dEn
d∆
< 0 and dEn
dP
> 0. From Lemma 1,
dn1(h)
dµh
> 0, dn1(i)
dµi
< dn1(j)
dµj
, given that µi > µj from (9). This implies that
d (n1(i) + n1(j))
d∆
=
dn1(i)
dµi
− dn1(j)
dµj
< 0. (30)
Consider now the derivative of n2(i, i) + n2(j, j), that is, the second sum in (18), with
respect to ∆:
d(n2(i, i) + n2(j, j))
d∆
=
σ(1 + τ1(i)) + µiσ(1 + µiσ)
dτ1(i)
dµi
(1 + µiσ)2
− (31)
σ(1 + τ1(j)) + µjσ(1 + µjσ)
dτ1(j)
dµj
(1 + µjσ)2
= 4
[
dτ1(i)
dµi
τ(i)− dτ1(j)
dµj
τ(j)
]
< 0,
because
d
(
dτ1(h1)
dµh1
τ1(h1)
)
dµh1
=
d2τ1(h1)
dµ2h1
τ1(h1)−
(
dτ1(h1)
dµh1
)2
< 0. (32)
Consider now the derivative of the last sum in (18):
d(n2(j, i) + n2(i, j))
d∆
= σ
(1 + τ(j))(1 + µjσ)
2 − (1 + τ1(i))(1 + µiσ)2
(1 + µiσ)2(1 + µjσ)2
+ (33)
+
(µj + µiµjσ)
dτ1(i)
dµi
− (µi + µiµjσ)dτ1(j)dµj )
(1 + µiσ)(1 + µjσ)
< 0,
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given that µi > µj,
dτ1h1
dµh1
> 0, and
d2τ1µh1
dµ2h1
< 0.
Consider the derivative of En with respect to P :
dEn
dP
= n2(i, i) + n2(j, j)− n2(i, j)− n2(j, i) = (τ1(i)− τ1(j))(µi − µj)σ
(1 + µiσ)(1 + µjσ)
> 0. (34)
The expected number of established trade links is increasing in P and thus, decreasing in
political uncertainty.
Second, we show that dEte
d∆
< 0 and dEte
dP
> 0. The expected expenditures on trade
defined in (20) can be re-written as follows:
Ete = C¯ + 0.5(1− 0.5(µi + µj))[τ1(i) + τ1(j) + (35)
P (τ2(i, i) + τ2(j, j)) + (1− P )(τ2(j, i) + τ2(i, j))],
where C¯ does not depend on polarization. Consider the derivative of the above expression
with respect to ∆:
Ete
d∆
= (1− 0.5(µi + µj))(dτ1(i)
dµi
− dτ1(j)
dµj
+ (36)
P (
σ(1 + τ1(i))− dτ1(i)dµi )(1 + µiσ)
(1 + µiσ)2
+
−σ(1 + τ1(j)) + dτ1(j)dµj (1 + µjσ)
(1 + µjσ)2
) +
(1− P )(−σ(1 + τ1(i))−
dτ1(i)
dµi
(1 + µjσ)
(1 + µjσ)2
+
σ(1 + τ1(j)) +
dτ1(j)
dµj
(1 + µiσ)
(1 + µiσ)2
)) =
(1− 0.5(µi + µj))×
(
P
(
σ(1 + τ(i)) + µiσ(1 + µiσ)
dτ1(i)
dµi
)
(1 + µiσ)2
−
P
(
σ(1 + τ(j)) + µjσ(1 + µjσ)
dτ1(j)
dµj
)
(1 + µjσ)2
+
(1− P )
(
µjσ
dτ1(i)
dµi
− σ(1 + τ1(i))
)
(1 + µjσ)
+
(1− P )
(
−µiσ dτ1(j)dµj + σ(1 + τ1(j))
)
(1 + µiσ)
) < 0,
where the line before the last is negative as in (31) and the last line is negative because
dτ1(i)
dµi
> 0, d
2τ1(i)
dµ2i
< 0, and µi > µj. To show that expected expenditures on trade are
decreasing in political uncertainty, consider the derivative of Ete with respect to P :
Ete
dP
= 0.5(2− µi − µj)(τ2(i, i)− τ2(i, j) + τ2(j, j)− τ2(j, i)) = (37)
0.5(2− µi − µj)σ(µi − µj)(τ1(i)− τ1(j))
(1 + µiσ)(1 + µjσ)
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
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The derivative of V gop with respect to P when trade openness is measured by the
number of trading partners is given by:
− (µi − µj)σ
2y22(τ1(i)− τ1(j))
2(1 + µiσ)2(1 + µjσ)2y21τ1(i)
2τ1(j)2
× (38)
((µi(1− P ) + µjP + µiµjσ)τ1(j) + τ1(i)(µj(1− P ) + µiP +
µiµjσ + (µi + µj + 2µiµjσ)τ1(j))) < 0,
so that the volatility of trade openness measured by the number of trading partners is
increasing in political instability.
The derivative of V gop with respect to P when trade openness is measured by the
expenditure on international trade is given by:
− ∆(µ− 1)
2σ(τ1(i)− τ1(j))
(1−∆σ + µσ)2(1 + (∆ + µ)σ)2(µ− (µ− 1)τ1(j))2(µ− (µ− 1)τ1(i))2 (39)
[2µ((µ2 −∆2)σ2 + 2µ+ µσ + 2µ2σ)(1− (1− 1/µ)τ1(i)τ1(j)) +
2µ+ (µ+ 2µ2 + ∆(1− 2µ)2(2P − 1))σ + µiµjσ2)τ1(i) +
τ1(j)(2µ+ (µ+ 2µ
2 −∆(1− 2µ)2(2P − 1))σ + µiµjσ2] < 0.
so that the volatility of trade openness measured by the expenditure on international
trade is increasing in political instability.
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